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Abstract 
The Uyghur population is mired in constant conflict with the authorities of the Chinese central 
government. This is due to the participation of part of the population –especially younger people- in 
local organizations associated with Islamic terrorism and often-violent activities that these groups 
perform against the State. 
Islam (such as laws, customs, and demonstrations) is the element that the PRC instrumentally 
employs in legitimizing its violent and restrictive policies against the Uyghur people, in order to 
maintain its power over the territory and its natural resources. This is also done while publicly 
presenting the measures as “War on Terror” and “Modernization” of the Uyghur Autonomous 
Region of Xinjiang. 
In the framework of decolonial studies, this research provides a detailed overview of the current 
religious colonialism of the PRC, and how religion and “War on Terror” became State tools of 
political repression. On the other hand, it aims to present Uyghurs’ territorial religious 
manifestations as one re-existence instrument, in opposition to the epistemicides that Beijing is 
committing. 
Keywords: Xinjiang, Islamophobia, China, Uyghur, resistance  
Resumen  
La población uigur está en conflicto constante con las autoridades del gobierno central chino. Esto 
se debe a la participación de parte de la población, especialmente de los más jóvenes, en 
organizaciones locales asociadas con el terrorismo islamista y actividades a menudo violentas que 
estos grupos realizan contra el Estado. 
El islam (entendido como leyes, costumbres y manifestaciones) es el elemento que la RPCh emplea 
instrumentalmente para legitimar sus políticas violentas y restrictivas contra el pueblo uigur, para 
mantener su poder sobre el territorio y sus recursos naturales. Esto también se hace mientras se 
presentan públicamente estas medidas como “Lucha contra el terrorismo” y “Modernización” de la 
Región Autónoma Uigur de Xinjiang. 
En el marco de los estudios decoloniales, esta investigación proporciona una descripción detallada 
del colonialismo religioso actual de la República Popular China, y cómo la religión y la “Lucha al 
terrorismo” se convirtieron en herramientas estatales de represión política. Por otro lado, su objetivo 
es presentar las manifestaciones religiosas territoriales de los uigures como un instrumento de re-
existencia, en oposición al epistemicidio que Beijing está cometiendo.  
Palabras clave: Xinjiang, islamofobia, China, uigur, resistencia  
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1. Introduction   1
Today, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
is one of the most relevant powers in the global 
geopolitical landscape. The Xinjiang Uyghur 
Autonomous Region (XUAR)  is the first 2
region by Muslim population in the country 
and is considered the focus of the largest 
disturbances and direct attacks to the nation’s 
security, due to the indigenous population’s 
affiliation to the local separatist movement. 
In an increasingly insistent manner, 
especially since the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 
2001, the central government has launched a 
series of anti-terrorism measures, with the 
objective of limiting the personal freedom of 
the Uyghur people and developing a greater 
control and power over their historical region: 
rich in natural resources —essential for the 
economic growth of the country— and placed 
in a geostrategic position —fundamental to the 
Central Asian dimension of Chinese politics 
and trade. 
The government is not willing to 
negotiate, so its way of handling the 
situation is repression; is to silence the 
speech of Uyghurs, like Professor Ilham 
Tohti, and all others who have risen up 
against the Chinese government; they 
are simply told that they are separatist 
terrorists, they jail them or they kill 
them (Interviewee, field notes).  
The aim of this article is to highlight the 
difference between terrorism and separatism, 
within the scope of the protest movements in 
XUAR, and show how the PRC’s restrictive 
 This article is part of the research group STAND (South Training Action Network of 1
Decoloniality; Reference: HUM-952; Principal Researcher: Antonio Ortega Santos). It is included 
in the framework of the I+D+i projects by the State Program for the Promotion of Scientific and 
Technical Research Excellence: “Naturaleza gobernada. Un enfoque ecológico, institucional y 
cultural del manejo comunitario de recursos (Siglos XIII-XXI),” 2016 (Reference: 
HAR2015-64076-P); “Contribuciones de la resistencia civil para la prevención de la violencia, la 
construcción de la paz y la transformación de conflictos en los Territorios Palestinos y Colombia”, 
2015 (Reference: HAR2015-74378-JIN). Additionally, it was financed by the “Ayuda de Formación 
de Profesorado Universitario,” 2014, (Reference: FPU 14/01270). 
Thanks to Pedro Arellano García (pga11@georgetown.edu) for revising and translating this article 
from Spanish into English. 
 Starting at this point, this research refers to the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region with the 2
acronym XUAR, primarily when talking about the geopolitical territory as it is established and 
shaped by the PRC. Principally, it will use this acronym whenever it is talked about issues related to 
Central State-imposed politics over the territory. This usage is intentional, instead of the more used 
“Xinjiang” toponym, to highlight and show the official —though non real— “autonomy” of the 
region, as well as its official “belonging” to Uyghur people. Moreover, it uses the English 
transcription of the toponym of XUAR indigenous people —Uyghur, instead of any of the other six 
transcription existing (Uighur, Uigur, Uygur, Uighuir, Uiguir and Weiwuer)—, following the 
suggestion of The Terminology Normalization Committee for Ethnic Languages of the Xinjiang 
Uyghur Autonomous Region. For more information about this topic, Cfr. RFA (2010). ‘Uyghur’ or 
‘Uighur’? [Online] Retrieved from https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/uyghur-
spelling-09062010161733.html [Last accessed 09.07.2019]
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and epistemicidal policies towards the identity 
marks of Uyghur people have increased their 
Islamic manifestations and their belonging 
sentiment to the Umma, all whilst being forced 
to reject their religiosity in the public sphere 
and yet maintaining it as a movement of 
resistance in the private sphere. 
Specially since the 2009 Ürümqi riots, 
and so forth throughout the 2010 decade, the 
Government accelerated their campaign against 
the Three Evils of separatism, extremism and 
terrorism, and launched the People’s War on 
Terror, which progressively created an in-
security environment for Uyghurs, and a 
subsequent perception of the counter-terrorism 
measures as state terror (Smith Finley, 2019: 2) 
by the Uyghur population. The securitization 
—read, state surveillance— of the territory 
involves monitoring the daily life of the 
citizens of XUAR; mapping their movements 
and associations throughout their cities with 
highly close-ranged military checkpoints and 
hi-tech facial-recognizing softwares; violent 
police repression of dissent, in any form; 
unwarranted arrests to suspiciously dangerous 
people; vanishing political activists and 
opponents; forcing up into exile to those who 
can exit —legally or illegally— the PRC; 
locking up millions of people in alleged 
reeducation camps. The institutional fear 
instilled in the citizens; the violence 
perpetrated against civilians; the forced re-
education and abandon of identity and religious 
tradition; as Jo Smith Finley addresses in her 
article (2019: 20) “we can see that counter-
terror operations in Xinjiang, as presently 
c o n d u c t e d w i t h i n t h e s t a t e ’s ‘ d e -
extremification’ drive, fit Blakeley’s definition 
of state terror to a large extent.” The 
pacification narratives —within the frame both 
of Global War on Terror and President Xi 
Jinping’s “world of great harmony,” plan— 
largely publicized in state-controlled media, 
underlie the CCP need to hide a case of terror 
and mass detention/elimination committed by 
the state, to which people must resist in order 
to keep existing as a community —and as 
individuals.  
The space that is inhabited —the body 
and the land—, the community forms of 
management of that, therefore, acquires in this 
context an epistemologically worthy and de-
hierarchical value, which influences the way of 
conceiving and self-conceiving as a 
community. The conquest and  subsequent 
mechanisms of coloniality have imposed in 
XUAR changes in the ways of management 
and of relating to the natural environment, 
turning “particular ecosystems” into “modern 
forms of nature” (Escobar, 2016). Throughout 
this study, the term “coloniality” will be 
understood as a process that has certainly 
transformed the forms of domination deployed 
by modernity, but not the structure of the 
center-periphery relations worldwide (Castro-
Gómez & Grosfoguel, 2007: 13). In this 
particular study case, we are in a scenario 
where decolonization has not happened; in 
fact, it is still denied, by the government itself, 
that there has been a colonization per se. 
Coloniality, therefore, here, is built from the 
creation of denialist and inclusionist speeches, 
which nullify the possibility of the subjects’ —
in broad terms: the land of XUAR and those 
who inhabit it— very existence. Since, then, 
the ways of life of the subaltern groups, in all 
its aspects, are subject to the Modern/Colonial 
model, it is necessary to re-dignify the 
community attempts of survival and resistance, 
as one of the subjects oppressed by the 
mechanisms of capitalist modernity. 
Start ing from the framework of 
decolonial studies, the aim here is to insert this 
article in the corpus of the latest and most 
recent researches that work with the Uyghur 
people (Thum, 2014, 2018; Millward, 2018, 
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2019; Famularo, 2015; Harris & Isa, 2019; 
Leibold & Grose, 2016; Zenz & Leibold, 2017; 
etc.), deeply more committed to the people 
than vertebrates them, and amplified by the 
emergence of a current increasingly serious 
humanitarian situation, denouncing the 
“official”  —read, partial— character of the 
traditional historiographic studies on the 
Uyghur people; The bibliography, then, is 
reviewed and passed through the lens of the 
life (hi)stories of Uyghur political exiles, 
whose looks return an image of conflict that 
collapses the pacification narratives instilled by 
the Chinese government. 
La discrimination se présente comme 
un ensemble de contraintes diffuses, 
rarement explicites et brutales, qui 
amènent les victimes à développer de 
multiples stratégies, à ‘faire avec’, 
c ’e s t -à -d i re à ‘ cons t ru i re une 
expérience qui leur permette non 
seulement de vivre le mieux possible, 
mais aussi de ne jamais se laisser 
a s s i g n e r u n e i d e n t i t é q u i l e s 
invalide’ (Hajjat & Mohammed, 2013: 
31).  3
Recent events have favored the contact 
between the world population and concepts 
such as terrorism and Islamist fundamentalism, 
specifically through institutional media 
information services and episodes of regretful 
bloodshed and ferocity. However, the 
dissemination of these notions is part of a 
programmatic disinformation plan and wide 
spreading of generalisms, which managed to 
create a global feeling of Islamophobia. In 
praxis, this feeling is nothing but a form of 
cultural racism, “a form of racism that does not 
even mention the word ‘race’” (Grosfoguel & 
Mielants, 2006: 4) but based on moral 
judgments to establish a relationship of 
domination/downgrade. 
The accusations of fundamentalism and 
terrorism have become weapons for the 
legitimation of a North-centric program of 
cohesion, in a scenario of political and 
epistemological hegemony against a common 
enemy, represented by the Muslim peoples. 
If we define fundamentalism as those 
perspectives that assume their own 
cosmology and epistemology to be 
superior and as the only source of truth, 
inferiorizing and denying equality to 
other epistemologies and cosmologies, 
then Eurocentrism is not merely a form 
of fundamentalism but the hegemonic 
fundamentalism in the world today 
(Grosfoguel, 2010: 31). 
Following the last definition, the term 
“fundamentalism” acquires connotations of 
political domination, with the intention of 
setting up a “normal” behavior against another 
—in this case, the Islamic— considered 
dangerous and violent. In the case of Uyghur 
islam, in the PRC “the definition of a ‘religious 
extremist’ –and potential terrorist, since 
‘extremism’ is deemed the ideational basis of 
terrorism– has come to mean anyone 
participating in any Islamic practice, however 
peaceful” (Smith Finley, 2019: 11).  
 “Discrimination is a set of diffuse, rarely explicit and brutal constraints that lead victims to 3
develop multiple strategies, to 'do with', that is, to 'build an experience that not only allows them to 
live the best possible, but also never to be assigned an identity that invalidates them'”. In this article 
I chose to leave quotes in their original languages, and translate them into English in footnotes 
when needed.
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However, in order to be able to apply the 
foundations of decolonial theories to our —
geographical and research— field we have 
faced the need to overcome the criticism of 
Eurocentrism, and analyze the native Chinese 
forms —imperial and republican— of 
gene ra t ing and pe rpe t r a t ing s imi l a r 
mechanisms —that are not inherited. Blaming 
the contacts between European powers and 
China for the colonial characteristics of the 
country's relations with the conquered 
territories —we could include Tibet and 
Mongolia, both annexed at the same stage as 
the XUAR region at the end of the 18th 
century— would make us reproducers of an 
ideological, political, strategic and ontological 
appropriation that does not belong to us. In 
short, calling the Chinese colonial attitude 
“Eurocentric” would position us, again, in a 
hierarchical dichotomy of superiority 
compared to what has been ours —of the 
European powers— colonized object, to which 
we would detract from the ability to be an 
author of own colonial policies. Eurocentrism 
itself, then, must be replaced by the most 
appropriate term —of equal ideological 
repercussions— of sinocentrism; One of the 
premises from which this study starts, 
therefore, is the decentralization of the concept 
that the term hides, and the denunciation of 
China’s coloniality and Nation-State-centrism 
per se, and not as a byproduct, nor copy, nor 
inheritance of the Eurocentrated. 
The last decades have seen an increase of 
restrictive measures in many other aspects of 
the Uyghur culture and identity, such as in the 
fields of education —like the abolition of 
bilingual education (UHRP, 2007, 2015b, 
Schluessel, 2007)—;  
I've realized being here that everything 
is political, when talking about Xinjiang 
and China. The Chinese know 
absolutely nothing about the Uyghurs, 
and they are carrying out cultural 
destruction programs, making it 
difficult for new words to be inserted in 
the language —that is: 5/6 different 
words are inserted to refer to the same 
object or concept, to make it much more 
comfortable for Uyghurs to adopt the 
Chinese word; Uyghur language 
education is suspended, etc. I have 
noticed the weight of politics in all 
aspects of Uyghur (Interviewee, field 
notes). 
daily life —the restrictions in giving Islamic 
names to the newborn (RFA, 2017a, 2017b; 
WUC, 2017) and food customs (RFA, 2015)—, 
and aesthetics —the prohibition of practices 
such as the use of veil for women (Leibold & 
Grose, 2016); 
After 2009, students could not pray in 
their dormitories, and the term 
“Muslim scarf” was coined to indicate 
the scarf that covers the neck, which 
began to be banned. Scarves that only 
covered the head and tied at the back of 
the neck could be used, but those that 
covered the women’s neck were not 
allowed. I had never heard this term, 
and I didn’t know what he meant, when 
my secretary told me that in my classes 
he was no longer allowed (Interviewee, 
field notes).  
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or beards for men (Lipes, 2014; Hunt et al., 
2017).  4
There are “five types of people” in 
Xinjiang that cause Chinese authorities a great 
deal of anxiety: women wearing veils, jilbab, 
or hijab; men with long beards; or individuals 
wearing clothing featuring a star and crescent 
moon, which appear not only in the East 
Turkestan independent flag, but also universal 
symbols of Islam (Famularo, 2015: 5). 
In this area, what can be clearly defined 
as an epistemicide political program, also 
acquires a marked memoricide character. The 
programmatic rewriting of the regional history, 
combined with attempts to eliminate traditional 
identity markers —language, customs, rites— 
and religious repression, tend to carry out an 
“identity cleansing” process and to be replaced 
by authority-imposed standards. 
In the Seventies, Eighties… We never 
had history classes. Of course we had 
History of China, but in this History 
they just mentioned some Tibetan 
people, Uyghur people, just shortly. But 
they never discussed the whole Uyghur 
people History of the region. Chinese 
Central Government in 1980s, 1990s, 
and still, they did and still are doing a 
lot of History, official History… 
Xinjiang History, History of Uyghurs, 
mostly by some Chinese historian, of 
course. They have some standards, you 
know. First of all, Xinjiang since 
ancient times is part of China. This is 
one. Under this… slogan… we can say 
historical slogan… you can discuss this 
historical points. And also… another 
point is… official point is Uyghur 
people are a minority. History never 
had an independent State (Interviewee, 
field notes). 
The communities in exile, in the same way, are 
in the condition of being diluted in the 
r e c e i v i n g c u l t u r e s — “ m a i n s t r e a m 
cultures” (Interviewee, field notes)— and in 
many cases of not achieving —due to their 
diasporic and the obvious bureaucratic and 
diplomatic issues regarding their permanence 
and settlement in the States that host them— 
strengthen and spread their culture of origin, 
especially for the new generations born in exile 
(Interviewee, field notes). The responsibility 
lies with the families, who carry identity 
characteristics —linguistic, religious, daily 
customs— in the private sphere. However, and 
naturally, that entails a gradual impoverishment 
of the culture itself, relegated to the family 
environment and in general away from 
intellectual and cultural manifestations. “A 
language, used like this, within the family, is 
very limited. It’s no longer a language. When 
your children can read poems in Uyghur, when 
they can read literature, that means they know 
the l anguage . Otherwise , they on ly 
communicate” (Interviewee, field notes). 
 Article 38 of the 2015 XUAR Religious Affairs Regulation prohibits individuals from using their 4
“appearance [i.e. grooming], clothing and personal adornment, symbols, and other markings to 
whip up religious fanaticism, disseminate religious extremist ideologies, or coerce or force others to 
wear extremist clothing, religious extremist symbols, or other markings.” Article 60 subsequently 
stipulates that transgressors may face administrative or even criminal punishment, including fines 
ranging from 3,000 RMB (approx. $485 USD) to 5,000 RMB (approx. $800 USD). The regulations 
do not specify what constitutes “extremist” attire.
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2. Terrorist, Islam -ist/-ic/-ologist, 
separatist, and more crimes  
Before it was “separatist”. Now, you 
know, it’s terrorist. They’re always 
changing criminal names for Uyghurs. 
It is fashion right know in the whole 
world, so, you know, it’s easy […] for 
Uyghur people to connect to some 
criminal activity l ike terrorism 
(Interviewee, field notes). 
The r ise of the “- i sms”  in today’s 5
communication language is becoming an 
increasingly widespread and alarming 
phenomenon. The reflection of this research 
comes from a series of sensations generated by 
the depersonalization of guilt: a consequence 
of the very concepts that these “–isms” express. 
This will help the reader to get informed 
through the conventional and institutional 
channels, to perceive a really disturbing 
terminological indistinctness, and understand 
which terms alternates without critical spirit 
the denominations that title this section, thus 
making history of the concepts becomes a 
therapeutical instrument, as Luz Gómez (2018: 
cap.1) asserts, in order not just to revert the 
political and social processes, but to reveal the 
interests that moved those changes in social 
conditions and palate some of their effects, 
blocking the perpetration of the manipulation. 
This manipulation, as quoted below, creates a 
fertile field to categorizations —and, thus, 
segregation and repression of what is perceived 
as “illegal” and “dangerous.” 
La conciencia moderna tiende a 
otorgar a la distinción entre lo normal y 
lo patológico el poder de delimitar lo 
irregular, lo desviado, lo poco 
razonable, lo ilícito y también lo 
criminal. Todo lo que se considera 
extraño recibe, en virtud de esta 
conciencia, el estatuto de la exclusión 
cuando se trata de juzgar y de la 
inclusión cuando se trata de explicar. 
El conjunto de las dicotomías 
fundamentales que, en nuestra cultura, 
distribuyen a ambos lados del límite las 
conformidades y las desviaciones, 
encuentra así una justificación y la 
apariencia de un fundamento (Foucault, 
1992: 7).  6
Before entering into the reflection proposed for 
this section, it seems essential to stress that the 
construction of the “Other” —the repressed 
being— as a dangerous counterpart by the 
established political and moral order, 
legitimizes the authority —i.e. the State— to 
base their control strategies on hard and 
coercive measures, in order to not disturb a pax 
that is entirely fictitious. The reality itself, de 
facto, exists as soon as it is based on 
antagonisms and conflicts. Hence, the entity is 
 In fact, the suffix “-ism” was elected Word of the Year in 2015 and its use keeps increasing: 5
https://www.merriam-webster.com/words-at-play/word-of-the-year-2015/-ism. Last access: 
02.12.2017.
 “Modern consciousness tends to give the distinction between the normal and the pathological the 6
power to delimit the irregular, the deviant, the unreasonable, the illicit and also the criminal. 
Everything that is considered strange receives, by virtue of this consciousness, the status of 
exclusion when it comes to judging and inclusion when it comes to explaining. The set of 
fundamental dichotomies that, in our culture, distribute conformities and deviations on both sides of 
the limit, thus finds a justification and the appearance of a foundation.”
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in relation to the struggle it establishes with the 
“Other”: the recognition —or ignorance— of 
another identity. 
Nell’attività politica ha grandissima 
parte la fantasia; ma nell’attività 
politica l’ipotesi non è di fatti inerti, di 
materia sorda alla vita; la fantasia in 
politica ha per elementi gli uomini, la 
società degli uomini […] Se l’uomo 
politico sbaglia nella sua ipotesi, è la 
vita degli uomini che corre pericolo, è 
la fame, è la rivolta, è la rivoluzione 
per non morire di fame. Nella vita 
politica l’attività fantastica deve essere 
illuminata da una forza morale: la 
simpatia umana (Gramsci, 2011: 6-7).  7
When the comprehension of the “Other” —the 
“human sympathy” as quoted above in 
Gramsci’s words— lacks, the construction of a 
“-ism” is therefore shaped as the definition of 
an idea, an ideological collective, or an 
indistinct group, apparently accompanied by 
very well established characteristics and 
applied to all the entities that comprise it: 
“Uyghurs are Uyghurs more than they are 
Muslims” (Interviewee, field notes). In the case 
of religious beliefs, and in spite of not 
possessing, semantically –either positive or 
negative connotations-, we do find important 
differences, depending on the “-ism” which we 
are referring to. The term Buddhism does not 
raise concerns in public opinion, and yet 
Islamism —not to mention terrorism— is 
perceived as one of the most important threats 
of our times. 
T h e m o s t o b v i o u s p r o b l e m a t i c 
consequence is the creation of intangible 
entities: superior monsters, which citizens 
cannot face as individuals. The only viable 
solution to this battle is to resort to “powerful” 
bodies —the State, the government “—, as 
they are the ones that possess the means to 
enact contrasting measures: diplomacy or 
massive repressions and the use of violence. 
Apparently, we are made to believe that facing 
those issues is a field that does not correspond 
to the citizens but to the organs of power, 
especially because collectivizing evil is a 
fundamental strategy drafted to perpetuate the 
belief that being protected by higher organisms 
is necessary to ensure our safety and our well-
being; this fallacy would lead us into the 
“perennial definition of terrorists as non-state 
actors, a priori excluding states as agents who 
can practise terrorism” (Smith Finley, 2019: 
14). Indeed, the “-phobias” and the “miso-s” 
are daily weapons established in public opinion 
to take refuge in the care of the powerful, 
which gradually strengthen their role as 
indispensable. In the same way, they originate 
a generalization and categorization —
erroneous, in many cases— that associate 
individuals who share one or many 
characteristics with an incriminated group and 
include them in a common cluster. This is how 
being a Muslim becomes a reason for terrorism 
suspicion. Belonging to a religion is considered 
sufficient reason to activate preventive 
repressive measures and authorizes the 
application of a series of control protocols. If 
the global threat cannot be eradicated and the 
“-isms” cannot be practically eliminated, the 
 “Imagination plays a very large part in political activity; but in the political activity the hypothesis 7
is not of inert facts, of deaf material to life; the imagination in politics has for men the elements, the 
society of men [...] If the politician is wrong in his hypothesis, it is the life of men that runs danger, 
it is hunger, it is revolt, it is the revolution to avoid dying of hunger. In political life the fantastic 
activity must be illuminated by a moral force: human sympathy.”
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consequences fall on those who happen to be 
assimilated with them: “la consecuencia 
principal de esta confusión conceptual se 
podría resumir en que […] se equiparan los 
objetivos de la reislamización individual y 
colectiva con los mecanismos islamistas de 
organización política ” (Gómez, 2018: cap.1). 8
It is necessary to highlight the extent to 
which modern research emphasizes the 
arbitrary process in which differences are 
designated and used as tools of ontological and 
hierarchical categorization. However, religion 
is a very specific categorization by itself and 
can only be politically relevant when political 
actors endorse it. This is the case of China and 
its racialization/differentiation of the Uyghur 
people by their religious beliefs.  
In the history of the Uyghur people in 
XUAR, since its definitive forced annexation 
to the PRC in 1949, and after the years of 
crude religious repression represented by the 
Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR), 
a period of Islamic revival was experienced; in 
general, this phenomenon can be evidenced in 
the different mainly Muslim minority 
nationalities present in the PRC; nevertheless, 
in the case of the Uyghurs, it represented an 
attempt to return to previously repressed or 
prohibited identity practices, but also a strategy 
of distinction between a people who perceived 
themselves as conquered and the oppressive 
power, bearer of anti-clerical and atheists 
values (Castets, 2003: 17). The attitude of the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) towards the 
identity manifestations —and, among them, the 
religious ones— of the Uyghur people has 
remained hard throughout the decades, for fear 
of separatist projects that could break the 
national balance: a large number of the newly 
built religious spaces, such as Koranic schools 
and mosques, which had been inaugurated after 
the end of the GPCR, became object of control 
by the authorities and, progressively and in an 
increasingly incipient manner, closed. Land, 
legends, history(-ies), traditions, religion; all 
the elements merge in the conformation of the 
identity of a people that sees its sacred places 
invaded and violated by the brutality of the 
modernizing and assimilationist  institutional 
ident i ty- tabula rasa p ro jec ts of the 
government. The Uyghur traditional collective 
construction of history (Thum, 2014), together 
with its staging and legitimization through the 
foundation of sanctuaries and sacred places 
connected with it, represented a process of 
democratization and oralization of history that 
united indigenous nomadic peoples; these, in 
the routes marked by the sanctuaries, founded 
and built a mobile history, and at the same time 
one that was deeply and intimately linked to 
their land and their ways of managing it. That 
history, through the dismantling of sanctuaries, 
i s depr ived o f pa r t o f i t s ma te r i a l 
representations, relegating in many cases the 
“access [to] affective experiences of religion, 
projects of self-fashioning, and the new 
geographies of knowledge and experience 
formed as Uyghurs” on a virtual and strictly 
individual level, connected to the “available 
scripts circulating in the wider Islamic world 
and adapted […] to a very local sense of crisis” 
(Harris & Isa, 2018: 61). 
And yet, it is fundamental that in the 
areas corresponding to this research, as well as 
in the daily praxis of our lives and experiences, 
to demystify and deconstruct the intangible and 
confer it a real identity. That is, to personify the 
crimes and those who commit them, so that the 
 “The principal consequence of this conceptual confusion might be summarized by saying that […] 8
the aims of both personal and collective reislamization are put on the same level as the Islamist 
mechanisms of political organization.”
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power falls in the hands of unique individuals 
and in the possibility of implementing it. 
Concentrating efforts to uproot criminal actions 
and violent behavior empowers the community 
itself, decreasing the level of need for 
interventions “from above”, in which the 
masses have no decision role. It is necessary to 
atomize the constructed entities and give each 
of them its singularities by eliminating the 
feeling of collective “guilt” of a group —in 
addition to a Jewish-Christian-centric matrix— 
and dismantling the same watertight idea of 
“group” as carrier of collective values —and 
crimes. As citizens and individuals, these are 
some of the measures that we must consider in 
order to terminate dangerous stereotypes and 
free the community of responsibility for the 
actions of unique members of it. 
In Social Sciences, we have the duty to 
refocus our attention on people by increasing 
academic interest in “-isms”. On the other 
hand, we must endeavor to recognize the 
p o l i t i c a l / p o l i t i c i z e d r o l e a n d t h e 
implementation of these “creations” by the 
power –“much of what the culture condemns 
focuses on kinship relationships” (Anzaldúa, 
1987: 40)—, to denounce the tools of media 
control and consciousness that these names 
imply, and to reveal the lack of scientific and 
social value of the categorizations and groups. 
3. Intimate Terrorism: Life in the 
Borderlands   9
In spite of the constitutional guarantees of 
linguistic freedom for minority nationalities, 
the Chinese Government has imposed the 
institutionalization of the Chinese language not 
only in education but also in employment, 
forcing the Uyghurs to place themselves in the 
Chinese middle class, in order to be 
competitive and able to survive both in the 
labor market and in the urban environment 
(Smith Finley, 2013: 226). However, this 
strategy can —and should— be read as part of 
a political program that we might be called as 
“internal colonialism” in the country, since it 
has been accompanied not only by the massive 
extraction of natural resources but also by what 
can be defined as a metabolic extraction of 
human resources. As a result of the imposition 
of the Chinese-State culture —language, 
cultural heritage, and official history— on the 
Uyghurs, the result of these policies is the 
epistemicide of the Uyghur culture (Santos, 
2010a, Smith Finley, 2013). 
Today, the XUAR region has around of 
23,000 mosques and Islam remains as one of 
the pillars of the social, economic, and private 
life of the Uyghur people (Smith Finley, 2013: 
101). Laws and food restrictions, imposed by 
the Koran, are largely observed within the 
Uyghur communities, becoming an important 
part of their identity patterns and claims. On 
the other hand, the government policy involves 
restrictive measures on religious freedom and 
practices that have impacted the Uyghur 
identity, helping to fuel an Islamic resurgence 
in the region.  
This government is becoming really 
stupid. The Uyghurs were not so 
religious. Yes, there were more religious 
people, but even being religious they 
was not extremists. I don’t know, in the 
last five years at least, there are people 
who are starting to do crazy things, like 
trying to leave China to participate 
in ... activities, in other parts of the 
world ... few, not many ... but when 
someone wants to take something away 
  This article borrowed the latter subtitle from the work of Gloria Anzaldúa (1987: 42).9
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from you, that becomes very valuable 
(Interviewee, field notes).  
The reactivation of Islamic practices —
favoured by the end of the GCR period— is 
considered, by experts such as Jo Smith Finley 
(2013), as reactive phenomenon, which draws 
in the historical and cultural roots of the 
Uyghur people, and imposes itself as a 
distinctive Islamic element of their identity vis-
à-vis the imposition of a programmatic identity 
“hanization” and cultural coloniality. 
One response within the Uyghur 
community itself has been the creation of 
stereotyped images of the Han to make a 
distinction between “non-Muslim population” 
and those who follow Islamic rules. The Han 
have been identified as “Ḥarām animals” —a 
great insult to the Uyghurs— due to their 
“dirty” diet, due to its different hygiene 
standards; and “poorly educated”, due to their 
habit of emitting flatulence, spitting, or 
blowing the contents of their nose on the floor 
in public spaces (Smith Finley, 2013: 101-107). 
However, as mentioned before, the 
establishment of a narrative by the Chinese 
Government about the “Muslims” and the 
emphasis on their religious nature of the de 
facto political and economic claims of the 
Uyghur people create an “Islamic problem” per 
se. Since 2008, some of the violent events that 
have taken place in the XUAR were directed 
against civilians and their alleged religious 
motivations, and might have common roots 
with jihadist terrorism (Millward, 2019: 28). 
Even so, the belonging of small clusters of the 
population to violent groups does not 
legitimize the repressive measures against a 
whole population with more than 20 million 
individuals. 
Meanwhile, the restrictive policy on 
religious and cultural freedom generates the 
radicalization of the population. A practical 
example of these policies is observed in the 
current religious repression that the State 
currently applies —in most cases violently— 
over the Uyghur minorities. The latter relates 
to the holiday of Ramaḍān,  which represents 10
one of the most important festivities in the 
Islamic World.  
From a religious perspective, before 
2009 in Beijing there was a climate of 
freedom. Even Saudi Arabia or 
Malaysia financed the University 
cafeteria to prepare Ramaḍān food in 
the evenings and early mornings 
(Interviewee, field notes). 
For some years, the Uyghur communities have 
complained of an increasingly repressive 
attitude of the State towards it. The 
government itself is forbids Muslim officials, 
students, and citizens of XUAR to respect the 
fasting period. This is done through official 
communications —effectively, prohibitions— 
or public actions that impede the normal 
development of religious activities, like the 
closure of food establishments during night 
hours when the Ramaḍān fast is suspended 
(Florcruz, 2015: 4-5). In addition, other 
r e s t r i c t i v e m e a s u r e s o v e r r e l i g i o u s 
manifestations include the fact that “authorities 
frequently require religious groups to submit 
texts for examination before they may be used 
for worship, [as well as] regional regulations 
 With roots in the Koran itself, Fasting (sawm) during the ninth month of the (lunar) year 10
represents the fourth of the Five Pillars of Islam (Arkān al-Islām). Anyone who denies her or his 
obligation would be considered a miscreant (kāfir). In some countries with an Islamic majority, 
breaking the fast in public is sanctioned personally as it hurts the common moral.
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forbidding mosque attendance for those under 
18 years old” (RFA, 2010). 
In its staging transformation towards a 
fully-hanizated society, the CCP requires a 
demonization of religion. The political factors 
that constitute the basis for independence riots 
and movements —both in XUAR and, for 
example, in Tibet— are ignored, while special 
emphasis is placed on State communications 
and official media. The Government portrays 
religion as an anti-pan-Chinese element and a 
disruptive force in the ideal of national 
harmony. An online audio recording released 
on October 2017 by the Xinjiang Communist 
Youth League, ostensibly with the intention of 
reassuring the Uyghurs, fully embraced this 
medical metaphor: 
If we do not eradicate religious 
extremism at its roots, the violent 
terrorist incidents will grow and spread 
all over like an incurable malignant 
tumor. Although a certain number of 
people who have been indoctrinated 
with extremist ideology have not 
committed any crimes, they are already 
infected by the disease. There is always 
a risk that the illness will manifest itself 
at any moment, which would cause 
serious harm to the public. That is why 
they must be admitted to a re-education 
hospital in time to treat and cleanse the 
virus from their brain and restore their 
normal mind. We must be clear that 
going into a re-education hospital for 
treatment is not a way of forcibly 
arresting people and locking them up 
for punishment, it is an act that is part 
of a comprehensive rescue mission to 
save them (Millward, 2019: 22-23). 
The Uyghur community sees these measures as 
a provocation, which only result in an increase 
in the tensions that exist between the majority 
and the Muslim nationality. In turn, this 
produces a greater sense of separation from the 
Uyghurs and a strengthening of their Muslim 
identity. 
In China, the Muslim people have 
become part of the landscape of the XUAR 
region, mostly because of their folkloric 
costumes, mosques, and traditional music. It is 
not difficult to find their typical businesses or 
places of worship within both cities and rural 
areas. They are also part of the social changes 
that this century endured, especially because of 
the Chinese economic development and the 
related exploitation of the natural and human 
resources imposed in the territory, stimulating 
the passage from a purely rural native culture 
to an increasing gentrification. The latter has 
motivated the hybridization and submission of 
the original regional culture through policies of 
sub-alternation and prohibition of the original 
pillars of the Uyghur culture and other 
minority nationalities that inhabit the area. 
Moreover, it also includes problems of 
transculturization and illegalization of original 
cosmovisions and epistemes. 
In this particular case, the past actions 
have allowed a series of identity and ethnic 
repressions, which in many cases forced the 
political exile of important sectors of the 
population –denying the possibility of living in 
the land they claim- and allowed a modern 
colonialism plan by the State –promoting the 
controlled migrations of large Han groups 
towards the region-. The official aim of these 
measures is to modernize and develop a large 
“backward” region at a technological and 
economic level (Becquelin, 2004). An 
indicative of the feeling towards this invasion 
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includes a song by Ömarjän Alim titled 
Mehman Bashlidim,  which was censored by 11
the authorities at the beginning of the 1990s. 
I brought a guest back to my home 
And at the back, lay down a cushion 
Now I cannot enter 
The house I built with my own hands 
By making him a guest revered 
I was separated from this home 
Receiving no seat in the orchards 
I laid my cushions in the desert 
I turned the deserts into oases 
And still more guests, they filled that place 
Then lopped off the entire branch 
And took the fruits away 
I brought a guest back to my home 
And at the back, lay down a cushion 
He jumped into the seat of honour 
And boss became to us 
And boss became to us 
4. Thoughts from (de)coloniality  
Then, why is it so necessary to decolonize the 
history of Uyghur Islam? Following Sirin 
Adlbi Sibai’s (2016) work, one of the most 
important elements that mus be deconstructed 
are the very discourses on Islam within the 
heterarchy of power: 
[…] la construcción de una consciencia 
islámica renovada e innovadora […] 
debe pasar necesariamente por la 
consciencia, análisis y resistencia 
e m a n c i p a t o r i a d e n u e s t r a 
deconstrucción y construcción por 
parte del imperio de la anulación del 
Otro en el No ser […] Abordo la 
descolonización de los discursos sobre 
[…] islam, a través de evidenciar, 
analizar y superar el limitante 
sistémico estructural que define y crea, 
de hecho, la cuestión a la vez que él 
mismo es producido por ella, dentro de 
un esquema heterárquico del poder 
(Adlbi Sibai, 2016: 19-20).  12
Starting from the colonial nature of the 
relationship established between the PRC and 
XUAR,  and the hybrid nature of the Uyghur 13
Muslim community within the image that the 
Umma itself provides, we are facing two 
different areas of decolonization. In the first 
 Using Joanne N. Smith Finley’s translation: “I Brought Home a Guest” (2013: 193).11
 “The construction of a renewed and innovative Islamic consciousness [...] must necessarily pass 12
through the consciousness, analysis and emancipatory resistance of our deconstruction and 
construction by the empire of the annulment of the Other in Not Being [...] I approach the 
decolonization of discourses about [...] Islam, through evidencing, analyzing and overcoming the 
structural systemic limitation that defines and creates, in fact, the issue at the same time that he 
himself is produced by it, within a heterarchical scheme of power”.
 It is impossible to address here the debate about this issue, which has been demonstrated in the 13
work of most contemporary authors who research the Uyghur issue. About this: Schluessel, E. T. 
(2016). The Muslim Emperor of China: Everyday Politics in Colonial Xinjiang, 1877-1933. 
Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachussets. Retrieved from http://nrs.harvard.edu/
urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:33493602; Jacobs, J. M. (2016). Xinjiang and the Modern Chinese State. 
Seattle/London: University of Washington Press; Leibold, J. (2007). Reconfiguring Chinese 
Nationalism: How the Qing Frontier and Its Indigenes Became Chinese. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan; and Sautman, B. (2000). Is Xinjiang an Internal Colony? Inner Asia, 2(2), 239-271.
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place, we need to denounce the political 
implications of the Chinese Nation-State 
Islamophobia and the consequent accusations 
of terrorism harassing the social movements of 
the Uyghur people. Precisely, autonomy and 
independence demands are the engine of an 
organized State repression that hides under a 
more dignified —in the eyes of the 
international community- mask of anti-
terrorism struggle. “China's use of the war on 
terror was intended to halt international 
criticism of its repressive policies towards 
Uyghur people but later it turned out to be a 
full-scale domestic campaign against 
terrorism” (Kanat, 2012: 510). Once again, as 
affirmed by Amin Maalouf, religion does not 
cease to be a mere “agglutinant of ethnic 
groups at war” (Maalouf, 2009: 105). 
On the other hand, it is necessary to free 
Uyghur Islam  from its inclusion (dictated by 14
colonial political and epistemological 
geography) in the Arab-Islamic world —
conventionally known as MENA — by 15
acknowledging the existence of aspects unique 
to the Uyghur ontological identity and dignity: 
The people of the Tarim Basin, the 
ancestors of modern Uighurs, along 
with Turkic tribes of the steppes and 
mountains (including the Kazakhs’ and 
Kyrgyz’ forebears), converted to Islam 
in several waves beginning around the 
year 1000. Central Asian Islam is quite 
different from that of the Middle East, 
however, and especially from that 
promoted in modern times by Wahhabi 
and Salafi groups sponsored by the 
House of Saud. Uighur prayer can 
involve chanting and dancing, and 
music is not forbidden (Millward, 2019: 
12). 
The diaspora character (Sayyid, 2010; 
Mandaville, 2001) of the universal Muslim 
community —the Umma— goes back to the 
establishment of the first Umma in 622 AD, 
year of the hijra (Olivieri, 2019). The Umma 
has undergone processes of geographical, 
ethnic, and epistemological expansion and 
diversification, heterogeneous with currents 
and ruptures —fitan, sing, fitna— that have 
pluralized and localized practices of Islam per 
se, in spite of maintaining this as a 
supraterritorial normative code and universally 
valid for every Muslim. 
The European colonialism and the 
repercussions it brought to the entire Islamic 
world —from Morocco to Asia-Pacific- 
represents the key moment in which the Umma 
became the symbol of anti-colonial resistance. 
 It is also necessary to differentiate the people traditionally denominated “Muslim Chinese”: the 14
Hui minority nationality. The Hui were officially recognized as a minority nationality since the 
founding of the PRC on October 1, 1949. Since then, the Chinese and the Chinese-speaking 
population of Islamic faith have been included under this denomination, adopting the national 
language and the dialect of the region in which they are based. Because of this greater proximity of 
the Hui to the majority Han culture, it is not unusual to refer to them with the simple name of 
“Muslim Chinese”. Nonetheless, it is essential for this purpose to clarify this concept. As Gladney 
(1996: 20) expresses: “Though the Hui are often referred to as the Chinese Muslims, because they 
generally speak Chinese and are more culturally similar to the Han than, say, the Turkish-speaking 
Muslims, this term is inappropriate and misleading since, by law, all Muslims in China are citizens 
of the Chinese State and thus Chinese”.
 Middle East and North Africa.15
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Said so, the liberating counterhegemonic 
element of the oppressive external yoke and 
the need to fight against a common enemy 
entails a deeper reflection on the Muslim 
intellectual scene on a global scale. The latter 
renews the willingness to build the Umma as 
an anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist defense 
through a pragmatic political and religious 
program, which advocates to the union of all 
Muslim people in a unitary State institution. 
The consequences of colonial domination, still 
visible after the attainment of independence, 
and the imposition of the socio-centric model 
as a derivation of imperialism, have favored 
the establishment of hierarchizing and 
homogenizing praxis within the Umma itself. 
All of which have become explicit in the 
imposition of patterns of “purity” and 
“authenticity” in the different Muslim 
landscapes, and have led to discriminatory and 
violent practices against critical groups. This 
exclusion of groups considered inferior by the 
powerful violates one of the basic foundations 
of the Umma has been attributed by some 
sources to the first caliphs and the same 
Prophet, whereby the differences within the 
community are a bless/ikhtilāf al-umma raḥma 
are propitiating the creation of the dominant 
narrative about Islam as a unique and absolute 
system. 
Migration represents the very basis of the 
Umma, which has been built extraterritorially 
from the hijra. In times of diaspora and 
migrations, its supranational dimension 
becomes a primordial element, mainly because 
it emphasizes in the locality of its essence and 
its intrinsic hybridity: the influences of socio-
cultural contexts in which the different 
practices are based on and from the daily life 
of the Muslim people. Undeniably, this 
increases the need of the people to mobilize as 
an Umma, recognizing themselves as an 
alternative political order, not only faced with 
an external “Other” —the colonial powers— 
but also within the same homogenizing drifts 
used by the power groups to persecute those 
who are considered subversives of their vision. 
If we change the latitude of these 
assumptions and apply the same colonial 
categories to the heterarchization that the 
Chinese Nation-State imposes on part of its 
population, we can include a scenario that 
reflects what was analyzed here. In the XUAR, 
the colonial relations are constructed as a 
programmatic tool to perpetrate plans of 
appropriation of land, natural resources, 
geostrategic position, and power at the expense 
of the indigenous populations’ management 
forms. Folklorization —that is, capitalization 
and monetarization— and elimination of the 
identity of the original people are the tools 
used by the State to effectively apply its 
plundering policies. 
The repressive measures, justified under 
a facade of “secularization”, are accompanied 
by homogenizing projects of the Uyghur 
religious culture. On January 2019, the Chinese 
Government and the China Islamic Association 
announced the implementation of a five-year 
plan to “sanitize” the Islamic practices and 
institutions of the country, with the aim of 
promoting the “core values  of socialism, 
traditional culture, laws and regulations” (RFA, 
2019: 3) and drafting an “Islam Made in 
China” (RFA, 2019: 28). These measures raise 
concerns of a possible “religion war” and 
further “attacks on culture, society, traditions, 
and lifestyle”, similar to the case of the Italian 
Deputy Prime Minister Matteo Salvini (Li, 
2019: 3), who promotes fear, rejection, and a 
feeling of danger towards “the others.” 
Leaving aside the worrying irony that arises 
from the CCP’s use of the xenophobic 
discourses, these are presented as a 
confrontation in excursus against the epistemic 
diversity represented by Uyghur traditional 
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religious culture —and Muslim— in general. 
The objectives pursued theoretically by the 
Chinese Government are summarized in the 
safeguarding of a “world of great harmony,” as 
President Xi Jinping has affirmed on numerous 
public occasions. However, according to The 
Global Times, a sister newspaper with the 
official spokesman of the CCP, the People’s 
Daily (RFA, 2019: 26): “Although there are 
people on Twitter who maliciously accuse 
China of totalitarianism and being a colonial 
power, they still have to admit that [...] in 
Xinjiang, religious extremism has been 
effectively addressed, [and] peace and order 
have been restored in the region” (Li, 2019: 6). 
The “peace” that the Government boasts 
of having achieved in the region is not at all 
perceived by its population and it was 
allegedly obtained thanks to the State’s war 
against the “three evil forces:” ethnic 
separatism, religious extremism, and violent 
terrorism. Nonetheless, the measures 
implemented to maintain that supposed 
“restored” order —occupation of the territory, 
prohibitions of cultural, identity, and religious 
p r a c t i c e s , c o n s e q u e n t e p i s t e m i c i d e , 
establishment of a surveillance State 
(Millward, 2018); 
It exists as a kind of... It is not exactly a 
list of wanted people... Families are 
classified depending on their political 
past, their educational level or their 
level of religious knowledge. My family 
was classified as “key family.” That 
means you can't do anything, you can't 
go anywhere. That is, you cannot ask 
for a passport. I'm here. I am 
considered a political activist, but I am 
not, I am a normal worker, I just try to 
tell the truth. My brother has been 
jailed twice for it, and my father is a 
very respectable figure in the town. But 
for that reason, we have been classified 
as “key family” (Interviewee, field 
notes). 
or, more recent ly, mass ar res ts and 
disappearances of nearly one million Uyghurs 
(Zenz & Leibold, 2017; Thum, 2018) and the 
establishment of 1200 reeducation camps 
(Millward, 2019)— made possible to include 
the PRC into the current Modern/Capitalist/
Colonial World System. Violence is imposed as 
the official way of maintaining order, in a State 
that proclaims itself harmonious in its diversity, 
while lacking the “ability to sustain a 
paradoxical curiosity that embraces complexity 
w i t h o u t r e l i a n c e o n d u a l i s t i c 
polarity” (Lederbach, 2005: 5). 
5. Final considerations. Islam as a 
decolonial resistance 
Since 2017, news  about the opening of 16
supposed political fields in remote areas of 
XUAR are being disseminated. In those camps, 
thousands of Uyghur people are being deported 
—according to the official communicates- in 
order to attend “vocational education and 
 “Thanks to remarkable reporting by Gerry Shih (now at The Washington Post) for the Associated 16
Press and Josh Chin, Clément Bürge, and Giulia Marchi for The Wall Street Journal, as well as 
important early stories from other researchers and correspondents, including Maya Wang (Human 
Rights Watch), Rob Schmitz (NPR), and Megha Rajagopalan (BuzzFeed News). Especially 
important is the Washington, D.C. –based Radio Free Asia Uighur service, which has for years 
provided detailed, accurate coverage despite notorious controls on information in 
Xinjiang” (Millward, 2019: 2).
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employment training centers” (Millward, 2019: 
3) and alienate subjects potentially involved in 
“extremist” activities, while promoting “other 
‘measures’ to counter ‘extremism’” (Millward, 
2019: 3). The State’s concerns stem from the 
supposed conviction that the world-recognized 
terrorist organizations, such as Al-Qa’eda and 
the IS, have expressed their intention to include 
the Uyghur people and their territory in a wider 
Islamist project on a global scale, with some 
even declaring their plan to annex XUAR to 
the Islamic Caliphate (Florcruz, 2014; 
Famularo, 2015). Nevertheless, anti-terrorism 
measures are part of a broader political plan for 
regional control and the suppression of 
m o v e m e n t s o f e t h n i c a n d n a t i o n a l 
independence promoted by the indigenous 
XUAR population do not take into account that 
“such calls for the strict Islamization of 
Xinjiang society are anathema to Uyghurs and 
other local minorities, who are moderate, 
syncretic Muslims” (Famularo, 2015: 1). 
In recent decades, the forced cohabitation 
—although segregated, in most cases— of the 
Uyghur people with the Han majority has 
increased multiple hybrid identities and new 
ways of local recognition, as well as an Islamic 
renewal and return to deeper character roots 
linked to religion; 
In Beijing we lived an Uyghur life with 
o the r Uyghurs , i n an Uyghur 
neighborhood: we barely had relations 
with Chinese, you know, normal stuff, 
good morning and goodbye. We did not 
feel much pressure because the Chinese 
did not identify us as Uyghurs, they 
considered us foreigners, they made 
comments like “how well do you speak 
Chinese”, “where have you learned to 
speak like that”, etc. At the beginning, 
before 2009, we did not perceive great 
repressions: we could make our voice 
heard, speak freely with the police, even 
respond to them badly. I really think I 
could do it because they didn’t identify 
me as  a Uyghur. After 2009, the 
attitude of the people begins to change 
when they discover that we are 
Uyghurs: we could not protest in front 
of the authority, we could not obtain car 
license plates, etc. […] When our son 
was born, we sent him to live with his 
grandparents in Ürümqi: we had no 
plans to stay in Beijing forever, and 
besides that, there he would not have 
been able to grow as a “Uyghur man”; 
He should have gone to a Chinese 
nursery, he would not have learned the 
language and culture of his people. It 
was a difficult choice, but we thought it 
would be the best for him (Interviewee, 
field notes). 
despite the fact that the State continues 
p e r p e t r a t i n g v i o l e n t n a r r a t i v e s a n d 
disseminating distorted images of the Uyghur 
people’s religious belonging, Islam has become 
a form of local re-existence and opposition to 
the epistemicidal and subalternizing policies of 
the Chinese Nation-State: a response to the 
failed developmentalist and modernizing 
measures imposed by the government, which 
breaks the traditional community dynamics of 
resources and knowledge management, 
imposing hierarchical laws, and asymmetric 
ethnic/ontological separations. It is imposed as 
an element of national unity, in opposition to 
the defeat that nationalistic aspirations have 
suffered vis-à-vis with the Chinese State 
(Smith Finley, 2013: 236). 
The stories related by the academics 
committed to the Uyghur cause and those who 
had the opportunity to extensively study the 
XUAR region give us a measure of how the 
situation of the local people has suffered 
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enormous and visible changes in recent years. 
Although the inter-ethnic situation shows tense 
hues —though not continuously-, the 1990s 
and the beginning of the new millennium were 
characterized by a manifest rebirth of 
religiosity in more visible facets. After the dark 
years of religious repression, represented by 
the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution 
(1966-1976), and the reestablishment of 
diplomatic relations with the greatest powers of 
the Middle East, a deeper cultural exchange 
have also manifested in the reopening of 
worship places and the growth of important 
links between the Islamic Association of China 
and —among others— Saudi Arabia. Also, the 
attire of the generations grown in the 1990s 
and the first years of the 2000s was modified, 
making more visible the signs of religious 
identity between the population, as well as of 
popular participation in symbolic events and 
places: mosques, Koranic schools, sanctuaries, 
etc. (Smith Finley, 2013). 
Nonetheless, the toughening of anti-
religious policies by the Chinese Government 
has reversed the latter trends, forcing an 
increasingly large swath of the population to 
publicly renounce to parts of their identity, and 
abandon customs and typical dresses of their 
religiosity (Famularo, 2014; Florcruz, 2015; 
Hunt et al., 20176; Leibold & Grose, 2016; Li, 
2019; Lipes, 2014; Millward, 2018, 2019; 
RFA, 2015, 2017a, 2017b, 2017c, 2019; 
UHRP, 2007, 2015), under the threat of being 
considered enemies of the State and liable of 
being repressed and punished. As the processes 
of hanization are imposed in public education 
and standardized under State precepts, other 
programs imposed by the government instill 
narratives and homogenizing speeches with a 
marked anti-Islamic character. 
These prohibitions harm the population’s 
possibility to express their belonging and 
prevent Islam from representing an intimately 
constitutive character of the Uyghur identity, 
always relegated to the exquisitely personal 
and private sphere. The process of pacification 
of the region, as the State proposes, goes 
through the violent repression of anyone who 
interrupts the imposed restrictive norms. On 
the contrary, it nurtures the creation of a 
conflict that ends up being internalized by the 
populations —both the Uyghurs and the Hans
— as “normal”, perpetrating a form of popular 
segrega t ion and rac ia l / I s l amophobic 
stereotypes. Indeed, Islam becomes an intimate 
and personal form of resistance against the 
oppression of the powerful, becoming an 
identity space, individual and national, in 
which collective feelings manage to overcome 
ontological separations and contest against 
epistemicide measures. This collective welfare 
does not cease to represent the interests of a 
group —a majority, at a population level- and 
the chosen path to eliminate all distinctive 
features, fostering the creation —in real 
“laboratories”, the reeducation fields- of a 
homogenous and unidirected society, 
standardized by the State. 
Derived from this article, if the focus of 
attention and interest lies on the conflicts 
generated as a result of hegemonic policies 
applied to those areas established as 
subordinates, as well as in the social protest 
that derives from appropriation forms —
colonial-territorial, identity, epistemic, and 
ontological—, we cannot stay away from 
launching a look at counter-hegemonic 
discourses that question the forms of 
relationships established within power, 
knowledge, and the ecosystem. Precisely, in its 
way of approaching this field, a central 
character —that in the Uyghur claims acquires 
dyes of re-existence- enriches the resistance. 
Though it is true that it has been tried through a 
theoretical foundation, always discovering and 
exposing some hegemonic tools, the forms of 
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indigenous struggle —a form of re-existence 
inside and outside the PRC— have a role that 
this research wants to prioritize. 
Bibliographic References  
Adlbi Sibai, Sirin (2016) La cárcel del feminismo. Hacia un pensamiento islámico decolonial, 
México, DF, Akal. 
Anzaldúa, Gloria (1987) Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza, San Francisco, CA, 
Aunt Lute Books. 
Becquelin, Nicolas (2004) Staged Development in Xinjiang, The China Quarterly, 178, pp. 
358-378. 
Cao, Xun; Duan, Haiyan; Liu, Chuyu; Piazza, James A. & Wei, Yingjie (2018) Digging the 
“Ethnic Violence in China” Database: The Effects of Inter-Ethnic Inequality and Natural Resources 
Exploitation in Xinjiang, China Review, 18(2), pp. 121-154. 
Castets, Rémi (2003) The Uyghurs in Xinjiang – The Malaise Grows. China Perspectives, 49 
[Online] http://journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/648 [Last accessed 12.06.2019] 
Castro-Gómez, Santiago & Grosfoguel, Ramón (Eds.) (2007) El giro decolonial: reflexiones 
para una diversidad epistémica más allá del capitalismo global, Bogotá, Siglo del Hombre 
Editores. 
Escobar, Arturo (2016) Sentipensar con la Tierra: Las Luchas Territoriales y la Dimensión 
Ontológica de las Epistemologías del Sur, AIBR - Revista Iberoamericana de Antropología, 11(1), 
pp. 11-36. 
Famularo, Julia (2015) Chinese Religious Regulations in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 
Region: A Veiled Threat to Turkic Muslims? Project 2049 Institute. [Online] https://project2049.net/
2015/04/08/chinese-religious-regulations-in-the-xinjiang-uyghur-autonomous-region-a-veiled-
threat-to-turkic-muslims/ [Last accessed 29.06.2019] 
Florcruz, Michelle (2014) Al Qaeda Wants Xinjiang In The Islamic Caliphate—But Uighur 
Leaders Say No. International Business Times. [Online] http://www.ibtimes.com/al-qaeda-wants-
xinjiang-islamic-caliphate-uighur-leaders-say-no-1710279 [Last accessed 15.06.2019] 
Florcruz, Michelle (2015) Ramadan 2015: Fasting Banned In China For Muslim Government 
Employees, Students And Teachers, International Business Times. 
Foucault, Michel (1992) La vida de los hombres infames, Buenos Aires, Altamira. 
Gómez García, Luz (2018) Entre la Sharía y la Yihad. Una Historia intelectual del islamismo, 
Madrid, Catarata. 
Gramsci, Antonio (2011) Odio gli indifferenti, Milano, Chiarelettere. 
Grosfoguel, Ramón (2010) Epistemic Islamophobia and Colonial Social Sciences, Human 
Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self-Knowledge, 8(2), pp. 29-38. 
Grosfoguel, Ramón & Mielants, Eric (2006) The Long-Durée Entanglement Between 
Islamophobia and Racism in the Modern/Colonial Capitalist/Patriarchal World-System. An 
Introduction, Human Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self-Knowledge, 5(1), pp. 1-12. 
Hajjat, Abdellali & Mohammed, Marwan (2013) Islamophobie. Comment les élites françaises 
fabriquent le "problème musulman”, Paris, La Découverte. 
 |54 Revista de Paz y Conflictos ▸ ARTÍCULOS ORIGINALES Olivieri, C.  ▸ Islam as decolonial re-existence vs. PRC institutionalized Islamophobia
Harris, Rachel & Isa, Aziz (2019) Islam by smartphone: reading the Uyghur Islamic revival 
on WeChat, Central Asian Survey, 38(1), pp. 61-80. 
Hunt, Katie; Luu, Chieu & Jiang, Steven (2017) Why China is banning beards and veils in 
Xinjiang [Online] http://edition.cnn.com/2017/03/31/asia/china-xinjiang-new-rules/index.html [Last 
accessed 01.06.2019] 
Kanat, Kilic B. (2012) “War on Terror” as a Diversionary Strategy: Personifying Minorities as 
Terrorists in the People's Republic of China, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 32(4), pp. 
507-527. 
Lederbach, John P. (2005) The Moral Imagination. The Art and Soul of Building Peace, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Leibold, James & Grose, Timothy (2016) Islamic Veiling in Xinjiang: The Political and 
Societal Struggle to Define Female Adornment, The China Journal, 76, pp. 78-102. 
Li, Qingqing (2019) China explores effective governance of religion in secular world, Global 
Times. [Online] http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1134750.shtml [Last accessed 12.06.2019] 
Lipes, Joshua (2014) Xinjiang City Bans Beards, Islamic Dress From Public Buses [Online] 
http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/karamay-08062014182306.html [Last accessed 
15.06.2019] 
Maalouf, Amin (2009) Identidades asesinas, Madrid, Alianza Editorial. 
Mandaville, Peter (2001) Transnational Muslim Politics. Reimagining the Umma, London and 
New York, Routledge. 
Millward, James A. (2018) What It’s Like to Live in a Surveillance State, The New York 
Times. [Online] https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/03/opinion/sunday/china-surveillance-state-
uighurs.html [Last accessed 09.07.2019] 
Millward, James A. (2019) ‘Reeducating’ Xinjiang’s Muslims, The New York Review of 
Books. [Online] https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2019/02/07/reeducating-xinjiangs-muslims/?
utm_source=chinafile&utm_medium=link&utm_campaign=none [Last accessed 19.06.2019] 
Olivieri, Chiara (2019) Umma, Dicionário Alice [Online] https://alice.ces.uc.pt/dictionary/?
id=23838&pag=23918&id_lingua=1&entry=24574 [Last accessed 28.06.2019] 
RFA (2015) China's Policy Forcing Uyghur Muslims to Sell Alcohol 'a Failure,' Sources Say 
[Online] http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/alcohol-08282015160013.html [Last accessed 
02.07.2019] 
RFA (2017a) China Bans 'Extreme' Islamic Baby Names Among Xinjiang's Uyghurs [Online] 
http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/names-04202017093324.html [Last accessed 07.07.2019] 
RFA (2017b) China Extends Ban on ‘Extreme’ Uyghur Baby Names to Children Under 16 
[Online] http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/names-04202017093324.html [Last accessed 
30.06.2019] 
RFA (2017c) Xinjiang Authorities Jail Uyghur ‘Religious Extremist’ For Scolding Son For 
Drinking. [Online] http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/drinking-11082017154732.html [Last 
accessed 20.05.2019] 
RFA (2019) China Plans to 'Sinicize' Islam as Muslims Warn of Eradication Campaign 
[Online] https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/islam-01072019124436.html [Last accessed 
25.06.2019] 
| 55http://dx.doi.org/10.30827/revpaz.v12i2.9808 ISSN 1988-7221 | Vol.12 | Nº 2 | 2019 | pp. 35-55
Santos, Boaventura de Sousa (2010) Descolonizar el saber, reinventar el poder, Montevideo, 
Ediciones Trilce. 
Sautman, Barry (2000) Is Xinjiang an Internal Colony?, Inner Asia, 2(2), pp. 239-271.  
Sayyid, Salman (2010) The Homelessness of Muslimness: The Muslim Umma as a Diaspora, 
Human Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self-Knowledge, 8(2), pp. 129-146. 
Smith Finley, Joanne N. (2013) The Art of Symbolic Resistance: Uyghur Identities and 
Uyghur-Han Relations in Contemporary Xinjiang, Leiden, Brill. 
Smith Finley, Joanne N. (2019) Securitization, insecurity and conflict in contemporary 
Xinjiang: has PRC counter-terrorism evolved into state terror?, Central Asian Survey, 38(1), pp. 
1-26. 
Tamayo Acosta, Juan José (2017) Teologías del Sur. El giro descolonizador, Madrid, Trotta. 
Thum, Rian (2014) The Sacred Routes of Uyghur History, Cambridge, Harvard University 
Press. 
Thum, Rian (2018) What Really Happens in China’s ‘Re-education’ Camps, The New York 
Times [Online] https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/15/opinion/china-re-education-camps.html [Last 
accessed 30.06.2019] 
UHRP (2007) Uyghur Language Under Attack: The Myth of “Bilingual” Education in the 
P e o p l e ’s R e p u b l i c o f C h i n a [ O n l i n e ] h t t p s : / / d o c s . u y g h u r a m e r i c a n . o r g /
UyghurLanguageUnderAttack.pdf [Last accessed 15.06.2019] 
UHRP (2015) Uyghur Voices on Education: China’s Assimilative ‘Bilingual Education’ Policy 
in East Turkestan. [Online] http://docs.uyghuramerican.org/pdf/Uyghur-Voices-on-Education.pdf 
[Last accessed 09.07.2019] 
UNPO (2018) East Turkestan: China’s Human Rights Abuses Against Uyghurs Ignored by 
Muslim World [Online] https://unpo.org/article/20991 [Last accessed 10.06.2019]  
WUC (2015) 2014 Report on Human Rights Violations in East Turkestan, Washington, DC. 
Zenz, Adrian & Leibold, James (2017) Xinjiang's Rapidly Evolving Security State, China 
Brief, 17(4), pp. 21-27. 
 
PROCESO EDITORIAL ▸ EDITORIAL PROCESS INFO 
Recibido: 09/07/2019 Aceptado: 20/01/2020 
CÓMO CITAR ESTE ARTÍCULO ▸ HOW TO CITE THIS PAPER 
Olivieri, Chiara (2019). Islam as decolonial re-existence vs. PRC institutionalized Islamophobia. Revista de Paz y 
Conflictos, Vol.12 (2), 35-55. 
SOBRE LOS AUTORES ▸ ABOUT THE AUTHORS 
Chiara Olivieri es Doctora en Estudios Migratorios por la Universidad de Granada (Dpto. de Historia Contemporánea/
Instituto de Migraciones). Es miembro del Grupo de Investigación HUM952 - STAND (South Training Action 
Network of Decoloniality) de la UGR. Es docente en el módulo “Epistemologías socioambientales. Narrativas para la 
reexistencia en el Sur Global” del Curso de Especialización en Epistemologías del Sur (CLACSO-CES-FLACSO), así 
como en el Master Oficial en Estudios de Asia Oriental (UGR). Es Investigadora Postdoctoral Asociada en el 
Proyecto de Investigación “Islamophobia in the East of the European Union” (University of Toronto).
